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Article
Delivering proportionate
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Abstract
This article advances a principled proportionate governance model (PPGM) that
overcomes key impediments to using health records for research. Despite increasing
initiatives for maximising benefits of data linkage, significant challenges remain,
including a culture of caution around data sharing and linkage, failure to make use of
flexibilities within the law and failure to incorporate intelligent iterative design. The
article identifies key issues for consideration and posits a flexible and accessible gov-
ernance model that provides a robust and efficient means of paying due regard to both
privacy and the public interests in research. We argue that proportionate governance
based on clear guiding principles accurately gauges risks associated with data uses and
assigns safeguards accordingly. This requires a clear articulation of roles and respon-
sibilities at all levels of decision-making and effective training for researchers and data
custodians. Accordingly, the PPGM encourages and supports defensible judgements
about data linkage in the public interest.
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Introduction
The linking of health records and other data for research has great potential to bring
about considerable improvements in the health and well-being of populations.1 Initia-
tives dedicated to maximising the benefits of data linkage, both within and beyond the
health sector, have already made significant progress.2 Models inWestern Australia3 and
Manitoba4 have proven particularly successful. The United Kingdom is also developing
initiatives, with strong encouragement from the government and significant financial
support of the major funding councils (Research Councils UK). The most recent
£19m collaborative funding call was an unprecedented endeavour involving all estab-
lished funding councils, Wellcome Trust, health charities and regional government
offices. It stressed that ‘ . . . it is vital that the UK research community is in a strong posi-
tion to maximise the health research potential offered by linking electronic health
records with other forms of routinely collected data and research datasets’.5 The era
of eHealth is truly upon us.6
The data linkage initiatives already existing in the United Kingdom7 have reinforced
very clearly the inadequacies of the current governance framework and its inability to
1. See, for example, Academy of Medical Sciences, Personal Data for Public Good: Using
Health Information in Medical Research (2011); Academy of Medical Sciences, A New
Pathway for the Regulation and Governance of Health Research (2012); R. Thomas and T.
Walport, Data Sharing Review Report (2008); W. Lowrance, Learning from Experience:
Privacy and the Secondary Use of Data in Health Research (London, UK: Nuffield Trust,
2002); B. Miriovsky et al, ‘Importance of Health Information Technology, Electronic Health
Records, and Continuously Aggregating Data to Comparative Effectiveness Research and
Learning Health Care’, Journal of Clinical Oncology 15 (2012), pp. 4243–4248; I. Kohane,
‘Using Electronic Health Records to Drive Discovery in Disease Genomics’, Nature
Reviews Genetics 12 (2011), pp. 417–428; C. Safran et al, ‘Toward a National Framework
for the Secondary Use of Health Data: An American Medical Informatics Association White
Paper’, Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association 14 (2007), pp. 1–9.
2. Such initiatives include: SHIP (Scottish Health Informatics Programme). Available at: http://
www.scot-ship.ac.uk (accessed 2 December 2012); EHR4CR (Electronic Health Records for
Clinical Research). Available at: http://www.ehr4cr.eu (accessed 2 December 2012); The
Secure Anonymised Information Linkage (SAIL) Databank. Available at: http://www.
ehi2.swansea.ac.uk/en/sail-databank.htm (accessed 2 December 2012).
3. Data LinkageWA. Available at: http://www.datalinkage-wa.org (accessed 14 September 2012).
4. Manitoba Centre for Health Policy. Available at: http://umanitoba.ca/faculties/medicine/
units/community_health_sciences/departmental_units/mchp (accessed 14 September 2012).
5. Medical Research Council, E-Health Informatics Research Centres Call. Available at: http://
www.mrc.ac.uk/Fundingopportunities/Calls/E-healthCentresCall/index.htm (accessed 29
August 2012).
6. As we have argued elsewhere, G. Laurie and N. Sethi, ‘Towards Principles-Based
Approaches to Governance of Health-related Research using Personal Data’, European Jour-
nal of Risk Regulation 1(2013), pp. 43–57.
7. See Scottish Health Informatics Programme, Electronic Health Records for Clinical
Research and The Secure Anonymised Information Linkage (SAIL) Databank in addition
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meet the needs of pre-existing and future (increasingly ambitious) linkages. The regula-
tory hurdles obstructing the optimal use of data for research are only too familiar and
have been extensively discussed within the literature.8 The same key challenges conti-
nually re-emerge. These are that the current landscape is primarily characterised by (i)
a culture of caution among data custodians, many of whom are unwilling to link or share
data, (ii) the failure to take account of flexibilities within the law that permit and support
such linking and sharing and (iii) the failure of the regulatory framework to reflect or
incorporate iterative intelligent design of instances of ‘good governance’.9
The establishment of the Health Research Authority in December 2011 was a clear
signal from the UK government to deliver more streamlined governance mechanisms.10
This concrete action is a manifestation of the political rhetorical commitment to
improvement and efficiency that followed the publication of the Academy of Medical
Sciences report in 2011 and which purported to lay down the ‘guiding principles’ for
advancement in this field:
to safeguard the well-being of research participants; to facilitate high-quality health
research to the public benefit; to be proportionate, efficient and coordinated and maintain
and, to build confidence in the conduct and value of health research through independence,
transparency, accountability and consistency.11
But the devil is in the detail of what this can, and should, mean in practice. These
‘principles’ have the quality of self-evident truths: no one would support a system that
was unsafe, obstructive, disproportionate and untrustworthy. Rhetoric aside, then, we
must ask what these claims and this opportunity will mean for the future of information
governance in health research.
We argue in this article that these common objectives can be achieved via the delivery
of a principled proportionate governance model. This has the potential not only to over-
come existing challenges but also to provide additional benefits to the governance frame-
work, for example, by stressing and facilitating a holistic approach to risk assessment,
which extends beyond a tick-box mentality towards responsible data sharing. In the first
part of the article, we examine forensically the key obstacles within the current
to: A Scotland-wide Data Linkage Framework for Statistics and Research: Consultation
Analysis. Available at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/08/3287 (accessed 2
December 2012).
8. See in particular: B. Rumbold et al., Understanding Information Governance: Access to
Person-Level Data in Health Care (London: Nuffield Trust, 2011); Academy of Medical
Sciences, ‘Personal Data’ and ‘A New Pathway’; R. Thomas and T. Walport, ‘Data
Sharing Review Report’.
9. J. Peto et al., ‘Data Protection, Informed Consent, and Research’, British Medical Journal
328 (2004), pp. 1029–1030.
10. By virtue of the Health Research Authority (Establishment and Constitution) Order 2011, S.
I. 2011/2323, the HRA has been established to protect and promote the interests of patients
and the public in health research.
11. The Academy of Medical Sciences, ‘A New Pathway’, p. 6.
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governance regime to reveal their true nature as part of a currently disconnected regula-
tory architecture. We acknowledge that whilst efforts have been made to ameliorate the
situation, substantial steps must still be taken before optimal governance is achieved.
Next, we offer key considerations that we argue must be taken into account when con-
sidering how to deliver proportionate governance; this includes the methods to be
employed to uncover what the considerations are, notably through engagement with sta-
keholders. Finally, we propose a principled proportionate governance model, highlight-
ing each of its key components and the significance of their inclusion. We use a case in
point to illustrate the added value which the model brings to practical implementation of
the notion of proportionate governance that is the central aspiration of the Health
Research Agency (HRA) and Academy of Medical Sciences (AMS). This is the example
of the Scottish Health Informatics Programme,12 sponsored by the Wellcome Trust,13
and which began operationalisation of a nationwide proportionate governance model
in Scotland in 2013.
Key obstacles within a suboptimal landscape
To state that linkage of datasets has great research potential is neither novel nor is it a
phenomenon that is exclusive to the health sector.14 Moreover, the complex regulatory
landscape around which researchers, legally responsible data controllers and others with
custodian duties for handling data must navigate to facilitate and/or conduct research has
also received extensive coverage.15 And yet, there is surprisingly little concrete discus-
sion in the literature about how to improve the situation. The growing number of initia-
tives dedicated to maximising the benefits of data linkage – including, but not restricted
to health, social care, environmental and education sectors – makes it imperative that the
key challenges impeding research are tackled, and most particularly that traditional
approaches to information governance are reconsidered.16
12. This is now known as the ‘ScottisH Informatics Programme’.
13. This work was supported by the Wellcome Trust through the Scottish Health Informatics
Programme (SHIP) Grant (Ref WT086113). SHIP is collaboration between the
Universities of Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh, Glasgow and St Andrews and the
Information Services Division of NHS Scotland. We would like to thank Wellcome for
their support.
14. See notes 3 and 4. Particular studies from the Scottish context include L. Govan et al., ‘The
Effect of Deprivation and HbA(1c) on Admission to Hospital for Diabetic Ketoacidosis in
Type 1 Diabetes’, Diabetologia 55 (2012), pp. 2356–2360; J. Walker et al, ‘Effect of
Socioeconomic Status on Mortality Among People With Type 2 Diabetes: A study from
the Scottish Diabetes Research Network Epidemiology Group’, Diabetes Care 34 (2011),
pp. 1127–1132.
15. Department of Health, Information: To share or not to share? The Information
Governance Review (2013). See also Academy of Medical Sciences, Personal Data;
R. Thomas and T. Walport, ‘Data Sharing Review’.
16. W. Lowrance, Privacy, Confidentiality and Health Research (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012) and ‘Learning from Experience: Privacy and the Secondary Use
of Health Data in Research’, Journal of Health Services Research and Policy 8 (2003),
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Extensive review of the current governance landscape and its challenges can be found
elsewhere.17 The following section suggests, rather, that the key obstacles currently
impeding data linkage research fall into three categories: (i) a culture of caution,18
(ii) a failure to take account of flexibilities within the law and (iii) a failure to build and
incorporate iterative intelligent design into the regulatory framework. This serves to cre-
ate a tabula rasa for considering thereafter what good governance in this field might look
like. It necessitates that the challenges are correctly identified and posits that governance
must be co-produced as part of a collective exercise between all stakeholders.
Culture of caution
The complex legislative landscape governing data use for research has been subjected to
sustained critique. The most common attacks centre on its overburdensome and confus-
ing nature.19 Key legislation, including both the European Data Protection Directive20
and its UK embodiment, the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998 are unhelpfully vague and
open to varying interpretation,21 even in terms of basic data protection concepts.22 The
numerous relevant legislative provisions that must be observed, not to mention the pro-
cedural requirements imposed upon data controllers and researchers, can prove both
unclear and yet onerous, causing unnecessary time delays, duplication of efforts and
pp. 2–7; D. Willison, ‘Privacy and the Secondary Use of Data for Health Research:
Experience in Canada and Suggested Directions Forward’, Journal of Health Services
Research and Policy 8 (2003), pp. 17–23; M. Law, ‘Reduce, Reuse, Recycle: Issues in
the Secondary Use of Research Data’, Spring IASSIST Quarterly (2005), pp. 5–10; J.
Brown and J. Semradek, ‘Secondary Data on Health-Related Subjects: Major Sources, Uses
and Limitations’, Public Health Nursing 9 (1992), pp.162–171; P. Lelliot, ‘Secondary Uses
of Patient Information’, Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 9 (2003), pp. 221–228.
17. See in particular: Academy of Medical Sciences, ‘Personal Data’ and ‘A New Pathway’;
R. Thomas and T. Walport, ‘Data Sharing Review’; G. Laurie and N. Sethi, ‘Current
Practices’ and ‘Towards Good Governance’.
18. House of Lords, Science and Technology Committee 2nd Report of Session 2008–09,
‘Genomic Medicine’ para 6.15. Available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
ld200809/ldselect/ldsctech/107/107i.pdf (accessed 2 December 2012).
19. See in particular: Academy of Medical Sciences, ‘Personal Data’ and ‘A New Pathway’;
R. Thomas and T. Walport, ‘Data Sharing Review’; G. Laurie and N. Sethi, ‘Current
Practices’ and ‘Towards Good Governance’.
20. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data Article 2(a) (hereafter referred to as the European Data Protection
Directive).
21. C. Bennett and C. Raab, ‘The Adequacy of Privacy: The European Union Data Protection
Directive and the North American Response’, The Information Society: An International
Journal 13 (1997), pp. 245–264; Y. Poullet, ‘The Directive 95/46/EC: Ten years after’,
Computer Law and Security 22 (2006), pp. 206–217.
22. European Commission DG JFS, Comparative study on different approaches to new privacy
challenges in particular in the light of technological developments (2010) p. 16.
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uncertainty. Reporting on the research framework within the UK, for example, the
Department of Health identified 43 pieces of relevant legislation, 12 sets of relevant stan-
dards and 8 professional codes of conduct, concluding that what ‘this has bred is a culture
of caution, confusion, uncertainty and inconsistency’.23
The mantra of ‘culture of caution’ has proliferated within the research community
(including data custodians and researchers) and has proven particularly difficult to dis-
place. Rather than risk sanctions for misunderstanding legislative requirements, some
data custodians have tended towards more conservative approaches to managing data
access requests,24 rendering access to potentially research-rich data problematic. This
has led researchers and data custodians alike to exercise ‘ . . . a degree of caution that
may go beyond what is required within the law itself. This can apply to individual judg-
ments around access to data, where possible solutions are not fully explored because of
the perception of the barriers’.25 The complex landscape and ‘the many actors and inter-
ests at play, makes confidently operating (and data sharing) within the research environ-
ment very difficult’.26 Ironically, however, as has been pointed out by the Information
Commissioner’s Office (ICO):
‘Organisations that don’t understand what can and cannot be done legally are as likely
to disadvantage their clients through excessive caution as they are by carelessness.’ 27
Put otherwise, doing nothing is not a sustainable option when it comes to lawful and
effective data management. Fear and ignorance are not excusable, and the path towards
a robust data custodianship system must begin with a sound grasp of the law, and impor-
tantly, the opportunities that it affords.
Failure to make use of flexibilities
A fact often overlooked because of the complex regulatory landscape is that flexibil-
ities to address some of the regulatory hurdles already exist within the current frame-
work. For example, a research exemption exists in data protection law whereby data
obtained for one purpose can later be used for a research purpose so long as two crucial
criteria are met:
23. House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, 2nd Report of Session 2008–09:
Genomic Medicine (Stationary Office, London, 2009), para 6.15.
24. Recognised, for example, by the Information Commissioner: Information Commissioner’s
Office, Data Sharing Code of Practice (Cheshire, ICO, 2011), p.4.
25. The UK Administrative Data Research Network, Improving Access for Research and Policy:
Report from the Administrative Data Taskforce (2012), p. 16. Available at: http://www.esrc.
ac.uk/_images/ADT-Improving-Access-for-Research-and-Policy_tcm8-24462.pdf
(accessed 10 May 2013).
26. S. Harmon and K. Chen, ‘Medical Research Data-sharing: The ‘‘Public Good’’ and Vulner-
able Groups’, Medical Law Review 20 (2012), pp. 516–539, at p. 522.
27. UK Information Commissioners Office, Anonymisation: Managing Data Protection Risk
Code of Practice (Cheshire, UK: ICO, 2012) in Commissioner’s foreword.
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(i) . . . the data must not be processed to support measures or decisions with respect to par-
ticular individuals, and (ii) the data must not be processed in such a way that substantial
damage or substantial distress is, or is likely to be, caused to any data subject.28
If applicable, the consequence is that data can be retained indefinitely (normally data
must be destroyed after original purposes for processing are met), and data subjects need
not be granted access to their data (otherwise a norm in the regulations), so long as
research results are not published in an identifiable form. Notwithstanding, a Code of
Practice from the ICO suggests that granting such access is good practice.29 Moreover,
the reduction in burden might be slight because, whilst consent to research uses is not
mandated, data subjects must still have adequate notice of the fact that data are being
used for research. And if consent is not obtained and research data cannot be published
in an effectively anonymised form, then subject access must be granted lest the
researcher be exposed to an action for breach of data protection (unless it could be shown
that there was no alternative but to publish the results in an identifiable form).
The restrictions on this exemption are largely driven by concerns about the autonomy
of the data subject. These are compounded by a related phenomenon that we have called
the ‘fetishisation of consent’.30 This has emerged as a key issue in recent times across
many areas of health law and regulation. It can be summed up in the current context
as follows: there is a tendency to view consent as a necessary requirement for using data
for research and to regard it as a panacea that alone sufficiently addresses the concerns
around data use for research. This obvious fallacy aside, and acknowledging that consent
may often be desirable, it is crucial to note that, in law, consent is not a requirement to
render uses legal.31 Far less is it necessarily the optimal of available mechanisms for
achieving the twin aims of protecting individual autonomy and promoting the public
interest in research,32 nor indeed for regulating data sharing more generally.33 Nonethe-
less, in the health data context, this reliance on consent translates to a tendency to shape
information governance mechanisms around the ‘consent moment’.34 Where this is not
28. Data Protection Act 1998, section 33.
29. ICO, Code of Practice, p. 46.
30. G. Laurie, ‘Evidence of Support for Biobanking Practices’, British Medical Journal 337
(2008), pp. 186–187; G. Laurie and E. Postan, ‘Rhetoric or Reality: What is the Legal
Status of the Consent Form in Health-Related Research?’ Medical Law Review (2012),
pp. 1–44.
31. See, for example, General Medical Council, Confidentiality (2009) p.18 and ICO, Code of
Practice, p.55
32. G. Laurie, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 335; N. Manson and O. O’Neill, Rethinking
Informed Consent in Bioethics (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007)
p. 212; O. O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, Gifford Lectures, University of
Edinburgh (CUP, 2002).
33. R. Al-Shahi and C. Warlow, ‘Using Patient-Identifiable Data for Observational Research and
Audit’ British Medical Journal 321 (2000), pp. 1031–1032.
34. For a rejection of this approach and an argument for the need to see consent as process in the
health research regulation context, see G. Laurie and E. Postan, ‘Rhetoric or Reality’.
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possible, anonymisation of data has emerged as the default. This has been referred to as
the ‘consent or anonymise’ approach.35
Anonymisation techniques render identification or re-identification less likely but
they do not, contrary to some belief, guarantee anonymity. Fortunately, the law does not
require this. The UK ICO has recently released its Code of Practice on anonymisation,
which emphasises that whilst anonymisation is desirable, it is not always necessary.
Rather, what is paramount in these cases is the security of the data.36 Thus, neither the
consent nor the anonymise approach is mandated nor, as we will argue, is either neces-
sarily conducive to effective data sharing for research.
A third governance pathway is authorisation. Authorisation involves an individual or
collective body making a decision about whether data should be shared (and in what
form) when it is neither possible nor practicable for the data subject to input to the pro-
cess and often when the data are identifiable. Caldicott Guardians,37 for example, are
responsible for deciding whether patients’ confidential data should be used, whether
or not the data need to undergo anonymisation and whether consent should be sought.38
Equally, the Confidentiality Advisory Group (CAG)39,40 in England is charged with con-
sidering research-based data access applications submitted to the HRA.41 It has authority
under section 251 of the National Health Service (NHS) Act 2006 to advise the Secretary
of State, when a study can go ahead in the public interest and using data without gaining
data subject consent. Similarly, the Privacy Advisory Committee (PAC) in Scotland42
advises the NHS National Services Scotland (NSS) and National Registers Scotland
(NRS) upon data linkages, effectively providing a form of authority to link or share data
by consultation and independent oversight.
It is our opinion that authorisation has not received the attention and consideration
that it merits as an alternative and complementary mechanism to consent and anonymi-
sation. As Law notes, ‘[m]any writers are passionate about the primacy of informed con-
sent’,43 with some considering that ‘the requirements to seek an individual’s consent to
participate and to provide data for a specific purpose must take precedence.’44 We
35. Academy of Medical Sciences, ‘Personal Data’, p. 3.
36. ICO, Anonymisation, p. 13.
37. National Health Service National Services for Scotland (NHS NSS) Caldicott Guardians,
see: http://www.nhsnss.org/pages/corporate/caldicott_guardians.php (accessed 2 December
2012).
38. G. Laurie and N. Sethi, ‘Towards Good Governance’, p. 16.
39. The Health Research Authority Confidentiality Advisory Group. Available at: http://www.
hra.nhs.uk/hra-confidentiality-advisory-group (accessed 7 May 2013).
40. Previously the Ethics and Confidentiality Committee – see National Information Governance
Board for Health and Social Care, Ethics and Confidentiality Committee. Available at: http://
www.nigb.nhs.uk/ecc (accessed 3 December 2012).
41. CAG is also charged with advising the Secretary of State on non-research applications.
42. NHS National Services Scotland, Privacy Advisory Committee. Available at: http://www.
nhsnss.org/pages/corporate/privacy_advisory_committee.php (accessed 3 December 2012).
43. Law, ‘Reduce Reuse Recycle’, p. 6
44. C. Kalman, ‘Increasing the Accessibility of Data’, British Medical Journal 309 (1994), p. 740.
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discuss the problems that arise when only relying upon consent further below, and
despite the initial objections that authorisation might raise, we would argue that ulti-
mately it represents an important governance mechanism whereby an individual or body
is entrusted as a proxy decision-maker. We appreciate the cultural challenges that might
be encountered in securing buy-in for authorisation-based mechanisms within the
research and data sharing context. We are not, however, suggesting that authorisation
should replace consent or anonymisation, but rather that it should be considered in tan-
dem with these governance tools that can operate alone or in combination to deliver good
governance across a range of possible circumstances. Moreover, in governance terms,
we contend that it delivers more robust means to protect the core interests at stake than
either consent or anonymisation alone.
None of these existing mechanisms can change the legal reality that ultimate respon-
sibility for data processing rests with data controllers.45 This status is one that exists as a
matter of fact and law, that is, if someone is acting in fact in the capacity as a data con-
troller in a literal sense that they control the data and their uses, then they will be treated,
as a matter of law, as the responsible data controller. This has further fuelled the culture
of caution for those who know that they are – or suspect that they might be – data con-
trollers. The fact þ law approach generates further anxiety and confusion within the
research and governance communities. The lack of legal certainty (or mandate) hinders
confidence within the system, preventing key actors from taking advantage of the flex-
ibilities available to them.
All of this points towards a number of conclusions and focal points for further action.
First, reform of the law is not a necessary first step to bring about reform of practice.46
The law already allows a lot to happen in terms of data linkage and sharing. Second,
attention should be drawn to the spaces in-between legal provisions – where judgement
calls must be made about data linkage. What is it that leads to a cautious approach for
those operating within these spaces? Is it only the threat of future legal sanction or is
it rather a lack of guidance and clarity on the purposes and values of data linkage itself?
Third, wither privacy in all of this? That is, what mechanisms, if any, exist for decision-
makers to weigh up considerations such as privacy risks and promotion of public interest
through robust data linkage? Finally, who is being asked to take these sensitive decisions
when the law might broadly permit discretion but offers little concrete guidance on how
to proceed and justify each outcome?We suggest that these issues are the proper focus of
regulatory attention and should be the subject of any models designed to deliver good
governance. Crucial to success, however, is the further need to ensure that any models
are responsive both to the needs of those whose data are being used (citizens) and those
45. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of such Data and UK Data Protection Act 1998
46. For example, see the recent ADT Report, Improving Access, which takes a ‘dual track
approach’, acknowledging the difficulties that can be encountered when making
legislative change and that ‘much can be achieved while the legislative timetable takes
shape’ p.18.
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who are being governed (researchers themselves). This is something that, as the next sec-
tion demonstrates, has not happened to date.
Failure to incorporate iterative intelligent design
It is evident from our discussion that the current landscape has been constructed in frag-
mented and disjointed fashion, with little attention paid to the coalface of data linkage
decision-making. This is particularly disappointing given the multitude of recommenda-
tions that have been made from notable reports and consultations, some of which we dis-
cuss in more detail below. Most worryingly, current frameworks have grown up
piecemeal,47 lacking sustained attempts to engage the diverse spectrum of stakeholders
who are affected by, and must work within, the regulatory environment. In sum, there has
been a net failure to incorporate iterative intelligent design. Successful incorporation of
such design involves a dialogical relationship whereby proposals advanced are continu-
ally sounded out amongst key stakeholders and most notably, amongst those charged
with implementing them in practice. This allows key weaknesses to be identified, solu-
tions sought and proposals subsequently reworked. This requires an ongoing reflexive
approach towards successful development of a framework and one that we have
employed as our dominant method in the development of our principled, proportionate
governance model (PPGM) below.48 This has been constructed largely outside legisla-
tive discussions. These, we believe, largely miss the point about what is required to
deliver good governance in this area.
The limits of law
The preceding discussion should not be taken to suggest that no efforts have been
made to ameliorate the situation. Some of the most notable attempts have centred
on clarifying or supplementing key legislation in the area. For example, the Article
29 Working Party – an independent advisory body on matters of European data pro-
tection – has released pertinent guidance for the eHealth community, attempting to
shed light on the key issues. In particular, it has issued advice relating to (i) the role
and relationship between data custodians and data processors,49 (ii) processing of
data relating to e-health records50 and (iii) the definition and role of consent in
47. MRC Ethics Series, Personal Information in Medical Research (London, UK: MRC, 2000).
48. We have argued for this elsewhere in the context of biobanks, see G. Laurie, ‘Reflexive
Governance in Biobanking: On the Value of Policy Led Approaches and the Need to
Recognise the Limits of Law’, Human Genetics 130 (2011), pp. 347–356. More generally,
see O. De Schutter and J. Lenoble (eds), Reflexive Governance: Redefining Public
Interest in a Pluralistic World (Oxford, England/ Portland, Or: Hart Publishing, 2010).
49. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of ‘‘controller’’
and ‘‘processor’’’, 00264/10/EN WP 169 (February 2010).
50. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document on the processing of
personal data relating to health in electronic health records (EHR)’ 00323/07/EN WP 131
(February 2007).
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lawful data processing.51 The European Data Protection Directive is under review52 and
attracting considerable scrutiny, particularly in light of the recent Albrecht Report that
advocates that research involving health data should only be conducted with data sub-
ject consent, which should be ‘freely given, specific, informed and explicit’.53 The pro-
cess for legislative intervention in this area is notoriously precarious.54 We avoid the
temptation here to digress into detailed discussion of proposed changes, which, although
of relevance to this topic, remain tentative and very likely to change. But more funda-
mentally, and absent an extreme volte face from the current legislative regime, the argu-
ment in this article is that legal reform is not required. It is, in many senses, a
distraction. Instead, we posit that the broad parameters for delivering good governance
are already laid down in the legal architecture and that more law is not the answer.
What is required, however, is a deeper understanding of how to operate within those
parameters and in keeping with the established data protection principles in both a
robust and effective manner to give effect to the twin purpose of the law to promote
responsible sharing whilst adequately protecting privacy. We advocate a detailed means
to work through the delicate balancing exercise that must be performed when individual
privacy interests are juxtaposed with public interests in the health research context.
Importantly, much of this framework is about offering assistance to data controllers and
decision-makers who operate in the regulatory spaces in between the legal architecture.
Thus, whilst the broad legal rules and principles55 offer a framework for decision-
making, they do not give much guidance to decision-makers on how to weigh up the
51. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent’
01197/11/ENWP187 (July 2011).
52. See ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World A European Data Protection Framework for
the 21st Century’. Available at: http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri¼CELEX:52012DC0009:en:NOT (accessed 19 September 2012).
53. EuropeanParliamentCommittee onCivil Liberties, Justice andHomeAffairs, ‘DRAFTREPORT
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of
individual with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data
(General Data Protection Regulation) (COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)),
p.198. Moreover, it is argued that if consent is not possible then research should only be
permitted if it served ‘an exceptionally high public interest’ and data must then be ‘anonymised
or at least pseudonymised using the highest technical standards’.
54. Indeed, member states were given 3 years to transpose the Directive into national legislation,
clear need for harmonised legislation was evident from the 70s and 80s – see Robinson et al.,
‘Review of the European Data Protection Directive’ (2009) Prepared for the ICO. See: http://
www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/review_
of_eu_dp_directive.pdf (accessed 19 September 2012). Additionally, member states faced
considerable challenges in implementing the Directive; most notably the European
Commission claims that the UK Data Protection Act 1998 is a defective implementation
of the Directive, claiming that it has failed to properly implement 11 of the 34 Articles.
55. T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th ed. (New York/Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001), at p.13.
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considerations56 and arrive at justifiable decisions about data processing. In this sense,
the value of our model serves as a complement to the legal framework in identifying
room for manoeuvre within it and by assisting relevant parties to occupy such spaces
responsibly. Legislative reform is unlikely to remove the role for key concepts such
as consent, anonymisation and public interest. Whilst it might place emphasis more
strongly on one rather than another, this article offers a defensible middle path through
an ever-changing landscape.
As the above suggests, we must therefore be conscious of the limits of law. Whilst
legislative reforms can make a significant improvement in clarifying obligations, they
also have the potential to breed more confusion; a fear already expressed around the new
legislative proposals.57 The ICO has warned:
it would have been preferable for the Commission to have developed one comprehensive
data protection instrument whether a Regulation or a Directive. Given the two different
instruments proposed, it is important for there to be as much consistency as possible
between these instruments.58
This also raises an important point about the role of harmonisation within the regula-
tory landscape, and we argue here that our model facilitates a coherent approach to gov-
ernance, which is nevertheless sufficiently adaptable for the different specific
circumstances implicated by different types of data linkage. Legislation is but one (not
always entirely effective) means of improving practice.
Extensive reviews of the regulatory landscape have included audits of current practice
and consultations extended across the research and data sharing communities, resulting in
recommendations for modification of the current framework. The Data Sharing Review,
for example, highlighted the default ‘consent or anonymise’ approach and called for clar-
ification of the legal framework, openness and transparency and the removal of unneces-
sary legal barriers, whilst simultaneously maintaining robust privacy protections.59 The
AMS stressed the need for proportionate governance as a reaction to the overburdensome
demands of the governance landscape, as outlined above.60 Most recently, the Caldicott
Review has added a new principle to the pre-existing six Caldicott principles: ‘[t]he duty
to share information can be as important as the duty to protect patient confidentiality’. The
additional principle acknowledges outright the importance of sharing information, a duty
often forgotten or which is seen as antagonistic to preserving confidentiality.61
56. M. Selgelid, ‘Universal Norms and Conflicting Values’, Developing World Bioethics 5
(2005) pp. 267–273, at p. 269.
57. House of Commons Justice Committee, The Committee’s opinion on the European Union
Data Protection framework proposals, Third Report (November 2012), HC paper HC 572.
58. ICO, Information Commissioner’s Office: Initial analysis of the European Commission’s
proposals for a revised data protection legislative framework (February 2012), p.2. See:
http://www.ico.org.uk (accessed 15 June 2013).
59. R. Thomas and T. Walport, ‘Data Sharing Review’.
60. Academy of Medical Sciences, ‘New Pathways’, p. 6.
61. Department of Health, Information Governance Review, at p. 62.
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We fully endorse these calls for clarity and proportionality and go far beyond them in
offering substantive argument and examples about what proportionate governance can
look like in practice. This is to ensure that the call to arms is not so abstract so as to
render its key message otiose. An added advantage is that our approach can improve
upon the governance landscape as it stands. It offers an account of the relative weight
that can be placed on various operational governance devices within the legal architec-
ture – such as consent, anonymisation, authorisation and public interest – in ways that
inform current and future legislative processes by revealing deeper understanding
about the interaction between these devices and arguments about their respective mer-
its and demerits. In the final analysis, the objective is to offer concrete mechanisms for
steering a path that simultaneously protects and promotes both private and public
interests.
Deliberative delivery: developing a PPGM
This section outlines the methods employed in developing our governance model. It
appraises the key governance considerations that emerged from our research and that
subsequently informed the development of our PPGM. The model was developed
within the context of the Scottish Health Informatics Programme (SHIP).62 This was
a Scotland-wide endeavour bringing together academia and NHS Scotland to
develop an infrastructure to facilitate better the uses of health data for research. The
interdisciplinary and collaborative nature of the project set the tone for the metho-
dology with an emphasis from the start on working closely with a diverse range of
institutions and individuals, enabling an iterative, discursive and multidisciplinary
approach to developing a governance framework. Early and sustained stakeholder
engagement was invaluable to identifying the key and diverse ethical, legal, social
and practical issues implicated in delivering a more streamlined system. Data con-
trollers and health researchers offered particularly important insights into trade-offs
and accommodation of interests to be made when navigating the uncertain regula-
tory environment. This research user engagement proved to be crucial in the deliv-
ery of an effective, robust and adaptive model, one that is reflective of the needs and
sensitivities of key stakeholders. Furthermore, given that all potential stakeholders
cannot be identified from the beginning, it became readily apparent that an efficient
governance model must be versatile enough to accommodate different stakeholder
needs which are both present at the time of construction and which might subse-
quently emerge. Obvious examples include cross-sectoral and international level
data linkage. A degree of foresighting was therefore also required to imagine future
scenarios that would test the limits of any system and also secure its adaptability.63
62. Now known as the ScottisH Informatics Programme; see further: http://www.scot-ship.ac.uk/
(accessed 15 June 2013).
63. On foresighting and law generally, see G. Laurie, S. Harmon and F. Arzuaga, ‘Foresighting
Futures: Law, New Technologies and the Challenges of Regulating for Uncertainty’, Law,
Innovation and Technology 4 (2012), pp. 1–33.
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The research commenced with the identification of key obstacles – actual and per-
ceived – impeding research using secondary datasets specifically within (but not
unique to) the United Kingdom, and more specifically, the Scottish context. An exten-
sive literature review surveyed primary and secondary legislation and case law, good
practice guidelines issued by professional bodies and recommendations emerging from
consultation reports.64 Secondary literature also contributed to developing an under-
standing of the status quo.65 We documented the functions of key actors within the cur-
rent framework, particularly researchers, data custodians and oversight bodies such as
the PAC in Scotland66 and regulatory bodies such as the Information Commissioner.
A detailed overview of the complex legal landscape is offered elsewhere.67 The fol-
lowing brief account of the key ethical and legal issues that emerged from our scoping
exercise (and consequently influenced the construction of our PPGM) is pertinent for
present purposes.
Navigating the path: key considerations for proportionate governance
Privacy. Paying due regard to individual privacy is rightly one of the most dominant
considerations within the current information governance framework. However, it is
not the only consideration, as reflected by the non-absolute protection given to
privacy under common law, statute and human rights regimes.68 Furthermore, it
is often perceived risk to privacy that provokes disproportionate procedural
64. A non-exhaustive list of sources we consulted included: Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data; Human
Rights Act 1998; Data Protection Act 1998; Opinions from the Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party; The Caldicott Principles; General Medical Council Guidance (particularly
Confidentiality, 2009); NHS Act 2006; The Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002
(FOISA), Academy of Medical Sciences, ‘Personal Data’ and ‘New Pathways’; Wellcome
Trust reports and guidance from the Information Commissioner’s Office.
65. Again, a non-exhaustive list includes:, J. Kaye and S. Gibbons, ‘Mapping the Regulatory Space
for Genetic Databases and Biobanks in England and Wales’, Medical Law International 9
(2008), pp. 111–130; W. Lowrance, ‘Learning From Experience’; J. Black, Forms and Para-
doxes of Principle Based Regulation, LSE Law, Society and Economics Working Papers 13/
2008 and The ‘Principles’ Paradox, Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 205 (2008); S.
Clark and A. Weale, Information Governance in Health: An Analysis of the Social Values
Involved in Data Linkage Studies (London, UK: The Nuffield Trust, 2011) and T. Beauchamp
and J. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
2009).
66. This body performs a similar role to the Ethics and Confidentiality Committee in England and
Wales, albeit that it does not operate under any statutory authority and is only concerned with
linkage of data sets held by the Information Services Division of NHS National Services
Scotland and theNational Registers of Scotland (the bodies which set-up the Committee in 1990).
67. G. Laurie and N. Sethi, ‘Current Practices’ and ‘Towards Good Governance’.
68. For full discussion, see J.K. Mason and G. Laurie, Law and Medical Ethics, 9th ed. (Oxford:
OUP, 2013), chapter 6.
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burdens.69,70 And yet, the law, for the most part, does not adopt a risk-based
approach to privacy protection.71
Privacy is a notoriously protean concept. Despite its well-recognised objective value
as demonstrated by its protected status in a plethora of human rights and other legal
instruments, it is – in fact – an inherently subjective notion for individuals. Opinion will
vary considerably between individuals as to what to them constitutes privacy and its
infringement. Often this will be highly context specific. In law, identifiability – that
is, the likelihood of being able to identify an individual from their data – is often used
as a key benchmark for triggering legal protection of privacy within the data sharing
sphere, notably data protection. This, however, rarely involves an assessment of the
nature or degree of the privacy risks or affront involved – which, again, will be depen-
dent on context.72 Furthermore, identifiability is itself particularly problematic.
Advanced technical procedures can ‘pseudonymise’ and ‘anonymise’ data, thus render-
ing re-identification of an individual highly unlikely, but it is impossible to guarantee
100% anonymity.73,74 The recent Caldicott Review acknowledges the problematic ‘grey
area’ of data where re-identification of individuals is possible, particularly when com-
bined with other data.75 The ICO stresses that 100% anonymity is not a requirement of
the DPA and in its new Code of Practice, it is encouraging practitioners to view anon-
ymisation as rendering the risk of re-identification remote rather than mitigating it com-
pletely.76 This reinforces the point that the risk assessment in determining adequate
privacy protection is crucial.
Matters are complicated further by a tendency to conflate privacy with other con-
cerns, most notably: autonomy, security, control77 and inaccessibility. With regard to
69. For discussion on the effect of communication of riskby themedia see:E.Singer andP.Endreny,
Reporting on Risk: How the Mass Media Portray Accidents, Diseases, Disasters, and Other
Hazards (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993); C. AbouZahr et al., ‘From Data to
Policy: Good Practices and Cautionary Tales’, The Lancet 369 (2007), pp. 1039–1046.
70. For a broader discussion on newspaper reporting of medical records, see L. Brown, M.
Parker andM.Dixon-Woods, ‘Whose Interest? BritishNewspaper Reporting ofUse ofMed-
ical Records for Research’, Journal of Health Services Research and Policy 13 (2008), pp.
140–145.
71. This being said, theDPA1998 does reflect ameasure of risk escalation in that if sensitive personal
data are involved then at least one condition of each of schedule 2 and 3 must be present. It is
important to note that this does not necessitate consent nor does it suggest that autonomy
trumps other considerations; rather it heightens safeguards for processing higher risk data.
72. An exception is found in the terms of the research exemption in section 33 of the Data
Protection Act 1998, whereby ‘ . . . data must not be processed in such a way that
substantial damage or substantial distress is, or is likely to be, caused to any data subject’.
73. P. Ohm, ‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization’, UCLA Law Review 57 (2010), pp. 1701–1777.
74. ICO, ‘Anonymisation’, p. 12.
75. Department of Health, ‘Caldicott Review’, p. 64.
76. ICO, ‘Anonymisation’, p. 13
77. See, for example, L. Bygrave, ‘The Place of Privacy in Data Protection Law’, University of
New South Wales Law Journal 24 (2001), pp. 277–283.
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privacy and autonomy, the latter tends to be determined by choice. It is not self-evident,
however, that the same is true of privacy: simply because an individual has made a
choice around whether she or he would like their information to be used (or not), this
does not guarantee that their privacy concerns will be met. Privacy and security should
also be differentiated: ‘security is necessary but not efficient for addressing privacy’.78
Privacy correlates with the use of data in that it implicates considerations of (mis)ap-
propriate uses and typically relates to policies and procedures around data sharing. Secu-
rity, however, relates to the protection that is afforded to data and relates more to
operational and technical considerations.79
The essential nature of privacy interests also raises important considerations. For
example, consider privacy and its relationship with the notion of control over informa-
tion relating to each of us. Control can exist at different levels, for example, the indi-
vidual level (via mechanisms including, but not limited to, consent). But individual
level control does not guarantee privacy protection if data are to be shared in any form,
because protection is also dependent upon external controls (such as privacy protection
policies).80 Unless an individual chooses complete inaccessibility of their data
(implausible in its own right), any consented use is dependent on external actors and
policies around information handling. This in turn requires actors to avert to the pri-
vacy risks that will arise from the use itself – including ones that might not be known
at the time any consent is given.
Whilst consent is not required under data protection legislation, under the common
law duty of confidentiality, many regulatory and governance responses have pro-
ceeded on the assumption that some form of consent must be obtained prior to disclo-
sure of personal information.81 This, however, has never been tested in the courts.
Moreover, the need for informed consent in the context of secondary uses for data has
been challenged with alternative solutions advanced. These include providing options
for data subjects to opt out of studies where their data are used, providing one-off
broad consent and including robust measures for ensuring privacy protection and safe-
guards to prevent indefensible infringements.82 Notwithstanding, there has been a con-
flation of consent concerns with privacy protection. A focus on consent has the double
78. L. Nakanishi, The Difference Between Security and Privacy and Why We Must Better
Communicate About Both, Data Security and Privacy Group (2011); available at: http://
datasecurity.edelman.com/the-difference-between-security-and-privacy-and-why-we-must-
better-communicate-about-both/ (accessed 25 March 2013).
79. P. Thompson, ‘Privacy, Secrecy and Security’, Ethics and Information Technology 3 (2001),
pp. 13–19.
80. For an interesting discussion on the need for separate notions of privacy and control see
H. Tavani and J. Moor, ‘Privacy Protection, Control of Information, and Privacy
Enhancing Technologies’, Computers and Society 31 (2001), pp. 6–11.
81. Lord Falconer of Thoroton, ‘Privacy law and medical research’ [letter]. Times 2001 May
17:21, cited in Peto et al, ‘Data Protection’, p. 130. See also Information Commissioner’s
Office, Data Sharing Code of Practice (Cheshire, ICO, 2011).
82. M. da Silva et al., ‘Informed Consent for Record Linkage: A Systematic Review’, Journal of
Medical Ethics 38 (2012), pp. 639–642.
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disadvantage that it distracts from the fact that privacy is not an absolute right, and it
can be justifiably encroached upon in the public interest.83,84 Thus, as noted by Tay-
lor, ‘[w]hile maintaining confidence in a health system might be an important public
health objective . . . ’ – in that if patients do not believe their doctors will fulfil their
obligations, they are less likely to step forward when infected – ‘ . . . at the same
time, health research is itself also an important part of protecting health gener-
ally’.85,86 To see privacy protection as an integral part of wider public health pro-
motion is crucial. It allows meaningful comparison of the relative interests at
stake in ways that are not possible if privacy is cast simply as a part of individuals’
autonomy interests. This is not to decry the importance of a role for consent, but it
does require us to reorient our understanding of what is at stake. If public interest is
a key and leading principle in guiding action in this area, then it requires a detailed
account of its significance.
The public interest. Akin to privacy, the concept of the public interest is difficult to
articulate across various realms of law, having attracted much attention from
beyond the health sector.87 Whilst the notion remains ‘ill-defined’,88 public inter-
est is perhaps more easily identifiable in the health context: the basic premise is
that medical research using individual patient data can contribute to scientific
knowledge that can be of benefit to the health of populations, individually and
at large, now and in the future.89 We share a solidaristic, common concern in the
83. Human Rights Act 1998 Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life. Article 8(1)
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence. Article 8(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
84. ECHR Jurisprudence also demands that in order to prove interference is necessary and
proportionate, the measure must demonstrate that (a) it addresses a ‘pressing social need’
(b) its operation is proportionate and (c) the reasons advanced for its existence are
relevant and sufficient. See Handyside v United Kingdom [1976] 1 EHRR 737.
85. M. Taylor, ‘Health Research, Data Protection and the Public Interest in Notification’,
Medical Law Review 19 (2011), pp. 267–303 at p. 277.
86. Department of Health, Caldicott Review.
87. For an informative account of the difficulties encountered with the public interest in the
media, see House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, UK, The future of
investigative journalism, 3rd report of session 2010–2012, HL paper 256 (31 January
2012), chapter 3. See generally, M. Feintuck, The Public Interest in Regulation (Oxford,
UK: OUP, 2005), and more particularly and recently, see ‘Leveson Inquiry: Culture,
Practice and Ethics of the Press’. Available at: http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/
(accessed 3 December 2012).
88. J.K. Mason and G. Laurie, Law and Medical Ethics, chapter 19.
89. J. Powell and I. Buchan, ‘Electronic Records Should Support Clinical Research’, Journal of
Medical Internet Research 7 (2005).
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protection and advancement of the public interest in health promotion,90 and this
necessarily requires that in some circumstances individual and competing public
interests must yield. Epidemiological studies or pharmacovigilance to identify drug
risks are simply not possible without access to health-related data.91 If the premise is
accepted, the challenge is to provide a defensible mechanism to conduct such trade-
off exercises. Fundamentally, there is the need to show that there is indeed a public
interest objective to be realised through a proposed data linkage. Given the primacy
of privacy (and confidentiality), this places a significant onus on those claiming
such a justification for data linkage and sharing. As a minimum, we contend that
every linkage proposal would have to demonstrate that it is scientifically sound and
that there are ethically robust reasons for the linkage. The strength of such a claim
will be increased if it can be shown, for example, that only linkage with identifiable
data will allow the public interest to be realised.92 But the spectre of consent is
never far away: can public interest offer sufficient justification to proceed as an
alternative to consent? More significantly, can public interest prevail even when
consent is withheld?
Public interest and consent. We have asserted above and elsewhere that consent is
often viewed as a panacea93 to all the risks brought up by data linkage. In the
context of privacy protection, we have suggested that simply because an individ-
ual’s consent has been obtained, this does not guarantee that their privacy interests
are being protected. As the dominance of consent in health-research regulation
has been increasingly challenged in recent years, we have witnessed a morphing
of the concept in an attempt to sustain its central role. Thus, we now have
examples of consent being characterised as explicit,94 informed,95 specific,96
90. B. Prainsack and A. Buyx, ‘Solidarity in Contemporary Bioethics: Towards a New
Approach’, Bioethics 26 (2012), pp. 343–350 and also ‘Solidarity: Reflections on an
Emerging Concept in Bioethics’ (London, UK: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011).
91. As Sheather notes, ‘confidentiality f . . . g serves a substantial public interest. A number of
other significant public interests are in tension with this. A centralised health database offers
enormous potential for research, which will itself feed into potential future health benefits.
How should these interests be traded against each other?’. J. Sheather, ‘Confidentiality
and Sharing Health Information’, British Medical Journal 338 (2009), p. 1458.
92. The Caldicott Review acknowledges the legal basis of using identifiable data ‘exceptionally
on public interest grounds’ however on the condition that linkage must only take place in an
accredited safe haven. See Caldicott Review, p.65.
93. G. Laurie, ‘Evidence of Support’ and ‘Genetic Privacy’; G. Laurie and E. Postan, ‘Rhetoric
or Reality’; N. Manson and O. O’Neill, ‘Rethinking Informed Consent’, and O. O’Neill,
‘Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics’.
94. M. Otlowski, ‘Tackling Legal Challenges Posed by Population Biobanks: Reconceptualising
Consent Requirements’, Medical Law Review 20 (2012), pp. 191–226.
95. A. MacLean, ‘From Sidaway to Pearce and Beyond: Is the Legal Regulation of Consent Any
Better Following a Quarter of a Century of Judicial Scrutiny?’, Medical Law Review 20
(2012) pp. 108–129.
96. M. Otlowski, ‘Tackling Legal Challenges’, p. 191.
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broad97 and generic.98 These last two examples are responses to the fact that it is
often impossible99 or impracticable to provide individuals with information in all
situations about what might happen to their information, especially when uses
might be in the future and as yet undetermined,100 or when data that are to be used
were obtained historically and for long-exhausted purposes.101 In the data protec-
tion arena, the European Article 29 Working Party has appreciated that consent
does not always provide a strong basis for justifying the processing of personal
data, particularly where consent is stretched to fit uses for which the consent was
not initially provided.102 Why then does the appeal of consent endure?
An ambivalence about the relative roles of public interest and consent was borne out
by our research that involved collaboration with colleagues in medical sociology who
undertook engagement exercises on attitudes towards data sharing. These confirmed
repeatedly the prima facie importance that people place in consent.103 Thus, albeit as
a strict matter of law, public interest might prevail over consent, pragmatic and ethical
considerations suggest that a more palatable practical approach would be to consider it a
rebuttable presumption that consent ought to be obtained. This suggests that if the route
is not to be taken, then strong justification and evidence for the public interest route is
required. This re-enforces an important point about governance options: consent is not
the only mechanism for justifying the use of patient data for research and public interest
has a crucial role to play but their respective roles will depend on what is at stake. What
is required, then, are mechanisms to assist researchers and data linkage decision-makers
to reflect upon and ensure that the appropriatemechanisms are put in place for particular
97. T. Caulfield and J. Kaye, ‘Broad Consent in Biobanking: Reflections on Seemingly
Insurmountable Dilemmas’, Medical Law International 10 (2009), pp. 85–100.
98. T. Caulfield, ‘Biobanks and Blanket Consent: The Proper Place of the Public Good and
Public Perception Rationales’, Kings Law Journal 1 (2007), pp. 209–226.
99. For example, where the information related to incapacitated adults of children.
100. This might arise where patients cannot be traced or are deceased, see E. Regidor, ‘The Use
of Personal Data from Medical Records and Biological Materials: Ethical Perspectives and
the Basis for Legal Restrictions in Health Research’, Social Science and Medicine 54
(2004), pp. 1975–1894 at p.1976.
101. For example, where the participants group is so large that the study budget could not afford
time or money to call each individual participant in order to obtain consent. See NHS NSS
PAC (Guiding Principles and Policy for Decision-Making and Advice) and P. Furness and
L. Nicholson, ‘Obtaining Explicit Consent for the Use of Archival Tissue Samples: Practi-
cal Issues’, Journal of Medical Ethics 20 (2004), pp. 561–564.
102. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2011) Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of
consent; available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/
wp187_en.pdf (accessed 12 April 2013)
103. From the SHIP context see: M. Aitken, S. Cunningham-Burley and C. Pagliari, ‘Public
Responses To The Scottish Health Informatics Programme: Preferences And Concerns
Around The Use Of Personal Medical Records’, Research Journal of Epidemiology and
Community Health 65 (2011): A27 and SHIP Public Engagement, ‘Your data and health
research: SHIP Public Workshops’, ‘What makes researchers trustworthy’. Available at:
http://www.scot-ship.ac.uk/publications (accessed 10 May 2013).
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data uses in any given set of circumstances. It is far less about proscription of consent
over public interest or vice versa as blanket positions and far more about constructing
an appropriate governance response for particular linkage proposals. To do so, we must
continue to consider the full range of the tools that is available in the governance
armamentarium.
Anonymisation. A crude form of responsive governance has already prevailed in the per-
functory ‘consent or anonymise’ approach.104 Certainly, anonymisation can offer many
advantages in the health research context. As Lowrance notes:
A way out of many problems should be de-identification, or anonymisation of data. If data
are not identifiable the data are not ‘personal’ and, unless safeguards are compromised, the
data-subjects stand only a very low risk of being harmed, which should be the principal
point and should obviate the need for express consent. Much, perhaps most, health services
research only uses anonymised data.105
Like privacy, however, this leaves us once again in the realm of non-absolutes. Anon-
ymisation techniques render the likelihood of re-identification of data subjects highly
unlikely106 but not impossible107 and the ‘grey area’ of data linkage can be particularly
problematic.108 The ICO has acknowledged that potential for re-identification via data
linkage is ‘essentially unpredictable because it can never be predicted with certainty
what data is already available or what data may be released in the future’.109 Further-
more, anonymisation sets up a potential tension with public interest: whilst it takes us
some of the way towards increased privacy protection, it can come at the cost of data
quality; the richness or research potential value of data sets can significantly diminish
once they have been anonymised.110,111 Equally, much valuable research can proceed
without the need to use identifiable data.112,113 This leads to two important conclusions.
104. B. Rumbold et al., ‘Access to Person-Level Data’, p. 7.
105. W. Lowrance, ‘Learning from Experience’, S1, p. 5.
106. Ohm, ‘Broken Promises’, p. 1710.
107. See in particular Homer et al., ‘Resolving Individuals Contributing Trace Amounts of DNA
to Highly Complex Mixtures Using High-Density SNP Genotyping Micro Arrays’, PLoS
Genetics 4 (2008), pp. 1–11 and Ohm, ‘Broken Promises’, p. 1701.
108. Department of Health, Caldicott Review, p. 64.
109. ICO, Anonymisation, p. 18.
110. ‘100% anonymity is almost impossible to achieve without the data set being reduced to one
data item, rendering it of little use for most research purposes’, Confidentiality and Security
Advisory Group for Scotland (CSAGS), Protecting Patient Confidentiality: A Consultation
Paper, Seeking Consent (2001). Available at: http://www.csags.scot.nhs.uk/ppc/ppc.pdf
(accessed 3 December 2012).
111. ICO, ‘Anonymisation’, p. 13.
112. Ohm, ‘Broken Promises’, p.1701 and CSAGS, Protecting Patient Confidentiality.
113. The recent ICO Code on Anonymisation aims to clarify the conditions for acceptable levels
of anonymisation and outlining when the process is necessary or desirable, whilst clearly
acknowledging that such guidance is deficient both at the EU and UK level data
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First, like consent, anonymisation can serve a useful role as a default starting point from
which departure is possible on good cause shown. Second, even if anonymisation is
deployed in some form, risks remain. Thus, central to any good governance model must
be appropriate risk assessment114 and the mechanisms and personnel to deploy this. This
returns us, once again, to the option of authorisation.
Authorisation. As described above, authorisation involves an individual or group making a
decision about whether data should be shared (and in what form) when it is neither pos-
sible nor practicable for the data subject to input to the process. Caldicott Guardians115
are the paradigm example of individuals who take on this role, whilst CAG in England
and Wales and PAC in Scotland perform similar functions as collective bodies. Author-
isation represents a move away from the binary ‘consent or anonymise’ model, but,
importantly, it does not preclude a role for either consent or anonymisation in govern-
ance outcomes. That is, a conclusion from an authorisation deliberation might be that
– in fact – consent should indeed be sought and/or that a certain form of anonymisation
should be applied to the data. The important substantive and procedural value of author-
isation lies in the opportunities afforded for deliberation, reflection, evaluation and risk
assessment. Transparency and communication of such processes are also crucial in
addressing possible issues of trust.
PAC in Scotland, for example, has an expectation that consent will be obtained where
identifiable patient data are used. Whilst it recognises that this is not always possible, it
holds that ‘in such circumstances, a clear explanation and justification should be
given’.116 Amongst other things, explanations/justifications may include demonstrations
of the scientific validity of a particular proposal, presentation of a strong case for why
obtaining consent is not practical and evidence that privacy risks are minimised as far
as possible and that adequate security measures are in place.117 Thus, authorisation
protection legislation. Whilst it is too soon to say whether the Code is successful in
clarifying to practitioners the issues around anonymisation, the extensive consultation
and efforts that went in to the Code stand testament to how problematic anonymisation
can be.
114. S. Shaw and G. Barrett, ‘Research Governance: Regulating Risk and Reducing Harm?’,
Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 99 (1994), pp. 14–19.
115. See Caldicott Guardians Forum. Available at: http://www.nhsnss.org/pages/corporate/
caldicott_guardians.php (accessed 30 July 2013).
116. NHS National Services for Scotland, Privacy Advisory Committee for Scotland, ‘Guiding
Principles’. Available at: http://www.nhsnss.org/pages/corporate/about_pac.php (accessed
30 July 2013).
117. In Scotland, in addition to PAC, the Community Health Index Advisory Group (CHIAG)
also holds a key advisory role in relation to patient demographics and research uses. In
each of these cases, the approach is similar: where consent or anonymisation are shown
not to be viable options, the authorising body takes on a scrutiny role to consider the
risks and benefits of linkage/use and to recommend an acceptable outcome. Where
linkage is approved, then often additional terms and conditions can be imposed, for
example, additional security measures or a reduction in access only to necessary data
sets essential to answer the research questions.
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provides a crucial piece of the governance puzzle by furnishing a means through which
to determine the most appropriate mechanisms to be used and standards to be met for
different linkage applications. This recognises that a one-size-fits-all approach is not
appropriate. Notwithstanding, an important cross-cutting consideration for all data use
and linkage applications is that of proportionality, that is, the robustness of justification
of any authorisation must be relative to a sound assessment of the benefits and burdens
involved.
Proportionality. Besides the key obstacles identified earlier, the most notable flaw tainting
the governance landscape is a lack of proportionality. The landscape is ridden with dispro-
portionate hurdles; many procedural mechanisms that researchers and data custodians
must follow prior to data sharing and linkage often fail adequately to reflect the nature and
degree of risks associated with such practices. As the Information Commissioner has said,
the risks have been ‘both understated and overstated’.118 This incommensurability of reg-
ulation and risk – in either direction – becomes a matter of disproportionality when the
regulatory burden greatly outweighs the relative risks. A failure to embody a sense of pro-
portion in data linkage mechanisms naturally perpetuates a culture of caution and further
impedes and delays progress with research.119 Thus, instilling and nurturing a more pro-
portionate approach to governance that pays due regard to relative risks120 is crucial. This
parallels one of the key recommendations of the influential Rawlins Report121 and the sim-
ilar risk-based approaches being implemented by the Medicines and Healthcare Products
Regulatory Agency with regard to clinical trials.122
Proportionality and its delivery by virtue of robust risk assessment are neither new
concepts nor novel features of legal systems by any means. Proportionality plays an
important role in European and human rights law, for example. Within the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) paradigm, any interference with many rights –
notably private and family life under Article 8(1) – must be necessary and proportionate
to meet a pressing social need under Article 8(2). Within European Law, the principle of
proportionality is interpreted similar to a rationality test whereby the suitability, neces-
sity and proportionality in its strict sense are considered against an alleged infringing
measure.123 In both contexts, proportionality serves to regulate the spaces in between
hard laws. It operates when discretion must be exercised and when varying interpreta-
tions or legal measures might be justifiable but depend on extensive variables that cannot
be legislated for on a case-by-case basis. Rather, an appeal to proportionality deter-
minedly requires that analytical judgement be performed; requiring appropriate
118. ICO, ‘Anonymisation’, p. 3.
119. Academy of Medical Sciences, ‘New Pathways’, p. 6.
120. S. Shaw and G. Barrett, ‘Regulating Risk’, p. 18.
121. Academy of Medical Sciences, ‘New Pathways’, p. 52.
122. MRC/DH/MHRA, ‘Risk-adapted Approaches to the Management of Clinical Trials of
Investigational Medicinal Products’ (2011). Available at: http://www.mhra.gov.uk/home/
groups/l-ctu/documents/websiteresources/con111784.pdf (accessed 5 December 2012).
123. T. Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’, European Law
Journal 16(2) (2010), pp. 158–185.
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consideration of material variables against a background of core objectives to be
achieved. Thus, when matters of private and family life are engaged, the nature, extent
and consequences of interference are judged relative to the nature, strength and impor-
tance of the social need. Proportionality acts as the weighing measure. Similarly, when
judgements must be made about the propriety of data linkage, we contend that the nature,
degree and likelihood of privacy (and other) impacts must be weighed relative to the
strength of the reasons for seeking linkage at all, notably in the public interest – as
robustly laid out in any given application for data linkage.
Wediscuss the specifics of these variables presently. Proportionality, however, has a cen-
tral role to play in acting as a temper in two keyways in the information governance context
and is an integral feature of our governance model. First, it complements the balance that
must be sought between privacy protection in the public interest and the public interest in
scientific enquiry and discovery by requiring a deeper account of what is actually at stake,
most particularly by asking about the relative strengths of the interests and likely threats
thereto. Second, it suggests thatmultiple and differential governance responses are themost
fitting regulatory responses because different combinations of variables – strengths of pri-
vacy interests/risks versus strengths of public interests and benefits – will require different
degrees of protection, sharing, oversight and, ultimately, sanction. In turn, this will require
differing deployment of governance mechanisms, sometimes favouring consent when, say,
sensitive data or contentious research questions are in play; sometimes favouring anonymi-
sation when the research objective can be realised without recourse to identifiable data.
Authorisation allows an important reflective and corrective input, promoting well-
informedand risk-based assessment of the entire range of considerations, aswell asmechan-
isms to give an account of deliberations and to communicate reasons and justifications.
A rather trite appeal to balance is nonetheless enhanced by an appreciation through this
account of the relative role and importance that each governance device brings and how they
can be deployed alone or in combination. Finally, a commitment to balance ensures that no
one principle or concern reigns supreme, albeit that evidence suggests that: ‘[i]t is undeni-
able that consent remains the primary policy device in legitimating medical research’.124
Going fishing: a template for proportionate governance
Having identified the key hurdles to overcome and the overarching ethical and legal prin-
ciples demanding continuous consideration, we offer here a template of key elements of
governance that serves as a blueprint for what optimal governance might look like in the
context of data linkage for research. This template provided us with a lens through which
to focus comparisons between the current approach and any under consideration. This
template was also an output of iterative design: not only does it capture emerging ques-
tions and concerns from the literature, but additionally it reflects expectations arising
from engagement with stakeholders in the field.125
124 . Mason and Laurie, ‘Law and Medical Ethics’, chapter 19.
125. Key stakeholders within Scotland (and predominantly the SHIP community) included:
researchers, data controllers, data custodians and data processors, and advisory bodies
responsible for advising on data access applications for research.
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The template offers three key functions:
1. It provides a flexible yet bespoke means of identifying key elements that reflect
the concerns of stakeholders and key issues highlighted within the literature;
2. It provides a means for identifying the strengths and weaknesses of any current
regulatory framework and
3. It facilitates comparisons between a current and proposed model of governance in
order to check whether, and if so how, any proposed model will improve upon the
status quo. Moreover, it provides a basis against which the fitness of a future
model can also be tested.
Table 1 offers an overview of our template for achieving optimal governance.
The considerations included in the template are by no means exhaustive; indeed,
questions should be tailored as appropriate to the specific governance setting under con-
sideration. For example, when considering cross-sectoral data linkage, one additional
Table 1. Template for optimal governance.
Question Key consideration(s) involved
Who are the key stakeholders
and are they satisfied? (Are the
right people engaged at an early
enough stage in the governance
process?)
Identifying and engaging with the various stakeholders
within a regulatory framework means that buy-in and
cooperation is much more likely, despite apparently
conflicting interests.
In what ways does any model
under consideration reflect a
proportionate approach to
governance?
Proportionality should be a key feature of any governance
system, legally, ethically and practically. It avoids excessive and
overly cumbersome procedures whilst paying due regard to
real risks and seeking appropriate measures where
fundamental obligations must be met.
Do all parties involved
understand the implications of a
particular model?
A major criticism of the current landscape is its complexity
and the confusion that it generates amongst researchers and
data controllers. Ensuring that all actors fully understand their
obligations and are confident in exercising them is paramount
to an effective governance system.
What vetting and training
methods will be implemented by
any model?
It is important to ensure that appropriate methods for
ensuring that only adequately qualified individuals gain
access to, and/or have responsibility for, data. This implies
a need for effective training and accreditation in any
governance regime.
Is there accountability within the
model and who is accountable at
each stage?
This requires articulation of key roles and responsibilities
within the framework and proportionate sanctions to be
in place for non-fulfilment.
How is the model monitored/
regulated?
This implies overview of key legislative provisions,
guidelines and oversight practices.
(continued)
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question might be: ‘how does the model accommodate or impede data sharing with other
sectors?’ A further consideration could involve data sharing on an international level, for
example, ‘how does the model deal with international data linkage, including ensuring
adequate ethical and legal standards are identified and met?’ Moreover, the template
is determinedly generic in that it can be applied within and across a range of data sharing
sectors. The purpose of developing such an instrument is to outline the pertinent issues
that must be addressed in governance design and that will remain uncovered by a simple
literature review. Applying our template proved particularly fruitful in (a) identifying the
differences between theory and practice, that is, what is assumed to take place in light of
regulatory requirements and what are the practical realities of realising these demands
and (b) teasing out the nuances within different settings/organisations and how they
approach the implementation of the governance demands.
Encouraging a range of stakeholders to apply the template to their work setting offers
a holistic multidimensional picture of current practice and related difficulties. Addition-
ally, it unveils the specific needs of the very actors required to navigate the framework on
a daily basis, rendering a proposed framework more likely to succeed in delivering good
governance. Asking such questions is effective for assessing current regimes and com-
paring them against future proposals. As such, our template is akin to performing a Gov-
ernance Impact Assessment. It is a process that helps to identify risks, options and
opportunities that include, but go far beyond, concerns about privacy and anything that
could be revealed by a privacy impact assessment alone.126
126. ICO, Privacy Impact Assessment. Available at: http://www.ico.gov.uk/for_organisations/
data_protection/topic_guides/privacy_impact_assessment.aspx (accessed 5 December 2012).
Table 1. (continued)
Question Key consideration(s) involved
How does the model fare when
subject to a Privacy Impact
Assessment (PIA)?
It is recommended by the Information Commissioner’s
Office that organisations carry out PIAs to identify privacy
risks to individuals’ personal information in order to identify
failures/strengths of a governance system in handling risks
appropriately. It can encourage proportionate rather than
conservative approaches towards risk.
How does the model reflect
public expectations and impact
on public confidence?
Engaging with the public, particularly in an initiative that
involves sensitive personal information is key. Taking
account of public expectations in a governance model can
engender public confidence, even when this does not mean
that all views become part of the model.
How does the current and
proposed model sit within the
legal order?
Compatibility of governance model with legal
requirements and, even further, whether or not the model
impedes/facilitates/makes optimal use of the legal
provisions.
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Developing and applying our template to the current regulatory landscape enabled us
to identify key weaknesses within the framework127 and to clarify issues that needed to
be addressed by any model to be developed in the future. Here, we outline the key themes
that emerged and subsequently informed the construction of our proportionate govern-
ance model.
The catch: key findings
First, our preliminary scoping of the literature asserted a discontent with the landscape,
well demonstrated above. Engaging with key stakeholders about their experiences in
practice confirmed this and served to highlight the most problematic areas encountered
in practice, for example, the extent of the hurdles that researchers encountered when
gaining approval for data access and the real and urgent need for clear and effective
training. We worked closely with the public engagement team who carried out inves-
tigations into the attitudes of key actors including researchers and data controllers.128
A key message to emerge of import in constructing our model was the importance of
having clear, accessible articulations of the legal obligations for different actors at dif-
ferent stages of data use; despite the inclusion of procedures for ensuring staff received
training around their data handling responsibilities, confusion remained about specific
obligations and how these could be fulfilled. This uncertainty is doubtlessly reflected
in the wider community and perhaps confirmed by the fact that data breaches persist in
that community. There is a tendency for breaches to attract extensive press coverage;
shaking public and professional confidence129 across a range of sectors, particularly,
where breaches occur within a trusted institution130 such as the NHS.131 Indeed, whilst
recommendations have been made for Scotland132 and UK-wide133 public education
campaigns to raise awareness amongst the public about how their data are used
127. SHIP is a partnership between Information Services Division (ISD) of NHS Scotland and
academic universities. We thus applied our template against the backdrop of the wider
legislative framework within the UK and more specifically, procedures as they stood
within ISD, custodian to the majority of NHS Scotland health information.
128. SHIP Public Engagement, ‘What makes research/researchers trustworthy?’.
129. B. Goold, ‘Technologies of Surveillance and the Erosion of Institutional Trust’, in K. Aas,
ed. Technologies of in Security: The Surveillance of Everyday Life (Florida, FL, USA:
Taylor & Francis, 2009) pp. 207–218 at p. 213.
130. UK Consumers Wake Up to Privacy. Available at: http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/
documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/icm_research_into_personal
_information_feb08.pdf (accessed 3 December 2012).
131. K. Long, ‘Opinion Article: Public Confidence in NHS Integrity is Under Threat from Staff
Breaches of Confidential Patient Information’ (2011). Available at: http://www.
ehealthnews.eu/industry/2750-opinion-article-public-confidence-in-nhs-integrity-is-under-th
reat-from-staff-breaches-of-confidential-patient-information (accessed 3 December 2012).
132. Scottish Executive Health Department, ‘The use of personal health information in
NHSScotland to support patient care’, NHS HDL 37 (2003), at p. 6.
133. See V. Armstrong et al., ‘Public Attitudes to Research Governance: A Qualitative Study in a
Deliberative Context’, Wellcome Trust Report (London, UK: The Wellcome Trust, 2007).
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(including data about individuals who are relatively well),134 levels of understanding
about data linkage and use are relatively low.135
Public engagement work within SHIP also uncovered the importance of trust in the
safe and appropriate use of data.136 Thus, in our construction of a governance template,
developing a model that reflected stakeholder and public concerns and attitudes was
paramount. In particular, we appreciated that at the time of developing our model, a
future move would be to develop initiatives that would facilitate cross-sectoral data
linkage, that is, linking data across different sectors, for example, police, welfare, edu-
cation and so on. Thus, any governance model must in many senses be both blind to
sector-specific concerns and at the same time sensitive to them. This governance par-
adox was addressed by identifying the common concerns and pressure points for
decision-makers across various sectors and designing governance tools of generic
applications. Most notably, as discussed below, this led to the development of a set
of transferable principles and instances of best practice that are both relevant and adap-
table across any number of fields. The overarching commonality is the articulation and
setting of gold standard benchmarks for data linkage and sharing that at the same time
guide decision-makers. This can operate to gain buy-in from data custodians in differ-
ent sectors to be willing to share data outwith their own organisations/sectors and at the
same time achieve a degree of approximation of considerations, standards and
approaches irrespective of the sectors within or across which linkage or sharing takes
place.
Risk also emerged as a key consideration. It transpired that despite ICO guidance
suggesting organisations should carry out Privacy Impact Assessments, not all organi-
sations took this on board; a lack of joined-up governance across different organisa-
tions and sectors was evident, suggesting a suboptimal detection of privacy risks
involved in data linkage. Of note, key issues that gave rise to the most confusion were
the vague nature of the DPA 1998 and the varying interpretations that had been adopted
of the European Data Protection Directive by virtue of the margin of appreciation it
grants to member states. Specifically, doubts endured over issues such as when/
whether consent is necessary, and what type of consent is appropriate (implied,
informed, broad etc). The interoperability of statute and common law further added
to the confusion, notably whether the duty of confidence requires an individual’s con-
sent even when the DPA does not.137 Further still, the potentially tense relationship
134. Department of Health, Information Governance Review, at p. 62.
135. P. Singleton et al., General Medical Council Public and Professional Attitudes to Privacy of
Healthcare Data: A Survey of the Literature (Cambridge Health Informatics Limited, 2007).
See: http://www.gmc-uk.org/GMC_Privacy_Attitudes_Final_Report_with_Addendum.pdf_
34090707.pdf (accessed 10 May 2013).
136. SHIP Public Engagement, What makes research/researchers trustworthy?’.
137. This issue gave rise to legislative change in England and Wales by virtue of section 251
NHS Act 2006 and the specific provision to allow the setting aside of the need for
consent in specific defined circumstances under the authority of the Secretary of State
(previously upon the advice of the Ethics and Confidentiality Committee, now the
Confidentiality Advisory Group. Such legislative change has never occurred in Scotland.
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between the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 and the DPA 1998 remains at
times challenging to negotiate given that the former serves to make (official) informa-
tion more freely available and the latter to limit access to (personal) information. Addi-
tionally, we must consider the difficulties around anonymisation mentioned earlier.
Clear guidance on anonymisation, acceptable procedures for carrying out the process
and the circumstances in which it was (un)necessary was lacking from both the UK
DPA and at a European level.138 A key lesson learned is that despite the associated
issues, both consent and anonymisation are important and must be central features
in a good governance model. This is both with respect to minimising risks and because
publics expect them to have a central role.
The juxtaposition of these findings with the outcome of our literature reviews led to
the conclusion that consent and anonymisation should remain the starting point to con-
sider within a proportionate governance approach. By the same token, we could assure
decision-makers that they can depart from these mechanisms and use other routes on
good cause shown, including where it would be disproportionate to attempt to deploy
consent or anonymisation. This approach should serve to reassure publics as being one
that it suitably couched in caution with respect to their autonomy and privacy interests
but which also seeks to promote the important public interests in play and to strike a
defensible balance of interests overall.
Another key lesson learned was the real need for coherent researcher and data cus-
todian training. In addition to the understandable lack of comprehension of the com-
plex legal and ethical landscape, vetting procedures are not robustly or uniformly
applied across the health sector. Indeed, we learned that many data sharing relation-
ships were based on trust and previous experience of sharing; a clear need for training
and vetting was identified. Transparent and intelligible procedures not only to estab-
lish who is accountable but for what, and when, are essential. This was not so much a
question of accountability and sanction at the level of the regulator – the ICO has now
been granted increased powers to impose monetary penalties of up to £500,000 on
those in breach of obligations139 – but rather this related to inter-institutional or per-
sonal accountability in data sharing arrangements at different stages of a data life
cycle.
Instead the de facto approach of the Privacy Advisory Committee is similar to that of CAG,
despite the lack of statutory powers, PAC advice carried considerable weight when advising
ISD. ISDs of NHS Scotland are custodian of a vast range of NHS health data, and NRS is
the National Register for Scotland.
138. Although we have mentioned that the ICO had now released its code of practice, it is hoped
that this will provide much needed clarity, alongside the work of the UK Anonymisation
Network. See: http://www.ukanon.net (accessed 11 May 2013).
139. As per powers enshrined under section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998, the ICO can
serve monetary penalties of up to £500,000 for breach of the Data Protection Act 1998
and serious breaches of the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations. At the
time of writing, the ICO has served some 26 monetary penalties since January 2012,
though note some of these have also been for breaches to Electronic Communications
Regulations. See: http://ico.org.uk/enforcement/fines (accessed 9 May 2013).
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In sum, the application of our template allowed four key themes to emerge: (1)
the need for clarification around which standards and values should be observed and
how this can be achieved; (2) the need for a proportionate, risk-based approach to
governance and how this might be operationalised; (3) the need for clarification
around the roles and responsibilities arising from data sharing and clear lines of
accountability and (4) the general need for training and accreditation around data-
handling issues.
Delivering principled proportionate governance
Our model comprises the following key elements that correspond directly with the key
needs we identified in our research. Here, we elucidate how these needs can be met
through: (1) guiding principles and best practice; (2) safe, effective and proportionate
governance mechanisms; (3) a clear articulation of the roles and responsibilities of data
controllers and (4) researcher training. We focus on the guiding principles and safe,
effective and proportionate governance elements because they enable us best to convey
the key message of this article – the importance of delivering principled proportionate
governance.
Guiding principles and best practice
From the outset, good governance demands an accessible articulation of the different
values and standards against which individual and organisational activity will be
assessed.140 Principles, by their very nature, offer the ideal medium for relaying these
standards141 due to their flexibility; they can be adapted and implemented in a manner
which best suits the level of decision-making taking place. Principle-based regulation
(PBR) has enjoyed much attention lately, most notably within the financial sector. Its
benefits can be translated to the data linkage context very well.142 Appropriately consti-
tuted principles are specific enough to convey the intention behind them, yet broad
enough to leave room for interpretation as each case demands143and as has been noted,
‘we need ethical principles to ‘‘permeate’’ down to all levels’ of decision-making.144 In
recognition of these strengths of principles, we have developed a set of guiding
140. Banff Executive Leadership Inc., ‘Improving Governance Performance: Rules-Based vs.
Principles-based Performance’, Leadership Acumen, 16 (2004), pp. 1–5; Black, Forms and
Paradoxes.
141. On the guiding principles of good governance, see Independent Commission on Good
Governance, The Good Governance Standard for Public Services (2004), at p.4.
142. G. Laurie and N. Sethi, ‘Towards Principles-Based Approaches’.
143. T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009); Seligman et al, ‘The Role of Values’; Financial Services Authority,
‘Principles Based Regulation’.
144. S. Arjoon, ‘Striking a Balance Between Rules and Principles-Based Approaches for Effec-
tive Governance: A Risk-Based Approach’, Journal of Business Ethics 68 (2006), pp. 53–
82, at p. 55.
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principles and instances of best practice (GPBP). These principles were the result of an
iterative process and developed by a Working Group comprising of a diverse range of
actors involved in data sharing and research.145
A key criticism of principles is that they are often vague in nature, failing to provide
adequate or specific content on how different values ‘ . . . should be factored into
decision-making processes, such as whether data should be made available for sharing,
whether institutional arrangements are sufficiently robust to accommodate data sharing
and whether appropriate governance mechanisms are in place for such sharing’.146 Thus,
alongside the guiding principles, a set of instances of best practice were developed, offer-
ing more concrete examples of implementation of the principles.
Our approach stresses the importance of viewing principles not as quasi-rules, but
as starting points for deliberation147 to exercise action and judgement within the exist-
ing legal regime. It openly acknowledges that principles might conflict and that dis-
cretion must be exercised in order to determine which set of principles should hold
sway in the particular circumstance. The value of this approach is that it invites and
requires reflection and justification. The principles that were identified were devel-
oped through engaging stakeholders on the issues and distilling these down to key
principles that provided a common language for deliberation on whether and how
sharing and linkage should occur. Self-evidently, the two principal principles at stake
are: (1) promotion of the public interest and (2) protection of the privacy and other
interests of citizens. A PBR approach would suggest that decision-makers strive to align
as many principles as possible, for example, by promoting anonymised data to deliver
robust research in the public interest. Where, however, this cannot happen, then other prin-
ciples might come into play. In the example above, where anonymisation cannot happen
or would unduly compromise the study, then it is a rebuttable presumption that patient
consent should be sought.148 Where consent is neither possible nor practical, the princi-
ples call for authorisation from an appropriate body/research ethics committee.149
Developing a set of agreed principles is not necessarily a clear-cut or smooth process.
It implicates all stakeholders within the regulatory landscape and as mentioned, must
145. Further details and access to materials from this group can be available at: http://www.scot-
ship.ac.uk/publications (accessed 10 May 2013).
146. G. Laurie and N. Sethi, ‘Towards Good Governance’, p.9.
147. See T Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 1995) at p. 719.
148. SHIP Guiding Principles: ‘Personal data must not be used without consent unless
absolutely necessary’; ‘Where possible and practicable, consent should be obtained
from each data subject prior to the use and sharing of personal data for research
purposes’; and ‘Where personal data are used, the reasons and justification for its use
are adequate and clearly explained.’ See SHIP Guiding Principles and Best Practice.
Available at: http://www.scotship.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reports/Guiding_Principles_
and_Best_Practices_221010.pdf (accessed 10 May 2013).
149. SHIP Guiding Principle: where obtaining consent is not possible/practicable, then (a)
anonymisation of data should occur as soon as is reasonably practicable and/or (b)
authorisation from an appropriate oversight body/research ethics committee should be
obtained.
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achieve a balance between versatility and specificity, whilst simultaneously remaining
true to its goal of nurturing respect for the various considerations evoked by a particular
framework. However, whilst the articulation and establishment of a set of principles is, in
our view, an integral foundation for a good governance framework, principles are by no
means intended to replace the role or content of legislation. Rather, they stress the values
and norms to be considered in addition to the legislative demands upon different actors.
Whilst the law provides flexibilities and space in between rules to exercise discretion, the
principles provide a common framework150 for discussing and deciding what should be
done,151 formed around the key considerations at stake. By the same token, guiding prin-
ciples within a framework should not be regarded as optional or unimportant: they are
the manifestation of key ethical norms and must be given due regard. This is so whether
or not they engage legal sanctions for non-observation. Thus, achieving buy-in and
endorsement from key actors is integral to the successful adoption of and respect for
principles. Their generic nature can be a strength.
The Scottish Government adopted an iteration of our Guiding Principles and Best Prac-
tice for its Scotland-wideDataLinkageFramework forStatistical andResearchPurposes.152
Such an endorsement and the proliferation that it guarantees across the Scottish research
community demonstrate the importance placed on having an accessible and flexible expres-
sion of central values and standards for decision-making in the research context. The UK
ICO has taken a similar approach to offering best practice guidance in its new code of prac-
tice for anonymisation.153 Similarly, to our GPBP, the ICO hasmade the purpose of the gui-
dance explicit, in stressing that it is not designed to replace legislation (in this instance, the
UKDPA), but rather to ‘plug that gap’154 between theminimal legal requirements set out by
the legislation and the practical measures to take to facilitate compliance.
Safe, effective and proportionate governance
Proportionality is a concept, which ensures that any measures taken (whether in terms of
sanctions for breaches/non-observation of key standards, or anticipatory measures in
place to assess risks within an organisation or across a regulatory landscape) correspond
to the gravity of any breaches, actual or anticipated.155 But, it is not first and foremost
about sanction. It is about matching the right governance pathway with the right risk
150. N. Daniels, ‘Accountability for Reasonableness, British Medical Journal 321 (2000),
p. 1300.
151. See, for example, J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).
152. Scottish Government, Joined-Up Data for Better Decisions: Guiding Principles for Data
Linkage (2012). See: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0040/00407739.pdf (accessed
30 July 2013).
153. See UK Information Commissioners Office, Anonymisation: Managing Data Protection
Risk Code of Practice (Cheshire, UK: ICO, 2012).
154. Scottish Government, Joined-up data, at p. 10.
155. In enforcing its fines, the ICO does not differentiate between public and private
organisations thus smaller research teams and organisations may lack the resources to
pay such fines/would be radically affected by receiving them.
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assessment – long before there is a need to consider sanctions. This raises once again the
central role that risk assessment plays in facilitating proportionate governance and the
importance of a holistic approach to risk and which encompasses a range of risks that
might include risk to privacy and reputation, or of distress to individuals through
re-identification. SHIP has adopted such a holistic approach.
Our risk-based approach demands that certain benchmarks must be met before a
holistic risk assessment is made. These benchmarks include seeking assurance on the fol-
lowing: safe data, safe people and safe environment. ‘Safe data’ involves data ‘ade-
quately protected in a manner corresponding with its sensitivities, but this should not
be to the extent that it renders data inaccessible or extremely difficult to access for
important research purposes.’156 A host of considerations are engaged when assessing
whether data are safe, including: whether consent is needed; whether a data reuse has
been justified (particular where anonymisation is not practicable or desirable); the level
of anonymisation, how disclosive the linked data may be, that is, how likely is it that
individuals might be identified if the data are put in the public domain.
‘Safe people’ corresponds to the need for effective training of individuals and a clear
articulation of the roles and responsibilities of different individuals throughout the
course of the data life cycle. SHIP operates a researcher accreditation system. A ‘safe
environment’ involves incorporation of sufficient security measures in order to ensure
that data are safeguarded. For example, one must consider who has access to the data and
in what circumstances the data may travel, if at all.
The paradigm example of this tripartite benchmark approach coming together is in
one of the SHIP safe havens. This approach has been recommended by the Data Sharing
Review, the AMS Report and most recently, the Caldicott Review. Much access is facili-
tated through these havens, which embody the three elements of safe data, people and
environment and typify a form of principled, proportionate governance. This approach
does not, however, work for all research, and so a more extended model also operates.
Moreover, if any application fails on any of these three benchmark criteria, a full con-
sideration by an authorising body is required.
In addition and directly related to the key benchmarks, we constructed a system that
categorises different types of data access applications according to different categories
of risk. In turn, these stratified risk categories correspond directly to increasingly strin-
gent terms and conditions that must be met in order to achieve authorisation for a link-
age to go ahead. The SHIP online toolkit (discussed below) helps researchers to anticipate
the category in which their access application is likely to fit; this means, in turn, that the
researchers can include the relevant details of relative risks associated with their study in
anticipation of the terms and conditions to which an approval might be subject.
Categorisation is a manifestation of proportionality. For example, in situations where
the privacy risks are minimal or negligible, and the likelihood of subsequent disclosure
very small, no further review will be needed. Where risks are marginally greater, a fast-
track process can be deployed that does not oblige a researcher to travel all the way to a
safe haven to carry out the linkage. The highest risk applications must always be
156. G. Laurie and N. Sethi, ‘Towards Good Governance’, p. 20.
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scrutinised by a suitably appointed authorising body. A Research Coordinator is respon-
sible for advising from an early stage under which category an application should be
made and a system of precedents will be built up over time. This further streamlines the
processes and reduces undue burden in preparation of applications. Importantly, and
reflecting the legal position, the data controller always retains the right to disagree with
a categorisation and/or to refuse linkage or sharing in the final analysis.
In sum, SHIP has taken a four-levelled approach to categorisation, inspired by the
Understanding Society Project Data Access Strategy.157 This promotes further interoper-
ability across sectors. The process is represented in Figure 1.
Category 0. This relates to data already in the public domain. Applicants are encouraged
to make full use of such data, and these data are brought to their attention if research
questions can be answered without the need to link personal or non-public data. This
categorisation exercise might involve a prospective disclosure control exercise.
Category 1 – low impact. These applications are those where risks are thought to be min-
imal or negligible, and in particular, where outputs are non-disclosive and non-sensitive.
Examples include those where no concerns are raised at stages one or two; the applica-
tion is for a linkage which is non-disclosive and non-sensitive, a safe haven system158
Figure 1. Categorisation of applications.
157. Personal Communication – Economic and Social Research Council, Understanding Society
Project, ‘Data Access Strategy’ Version 19.0. Note this is a draft and not currently available
online. It is imperative that there be an approximation of approach within and across sectors
to reduce regulatory burden and to help to ensure consistency of decision-making where this
is possible.
158. For technical details on how SHIP operates, particularly the role of safe havens, consult the
SHIP Blueprint. Available at: http://www.sco_ship.ac.uk/publications (accessed 10 May
2013).
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will be used, and/or applications are for a non-contentious extension of a previously
approved linkage.
Category 2 – medium impact. Category 2 applications are those where issues might be
flagged for possible further consideration. These could be sent to the relevant advisory
committee (in the case of SHIP, this would be PAC for Scotland) in an expedited form.
Examples include applications with moderate risks or concerns arising from the privacy
impact assessment at stage two; with repeat requests from multiple sector/international/
researchers who are able to demonstrate a trusted track record with respect to SHIP and
where the application is for a non-sensitive and non-disclosive linkage but safe haven
system will not be used.
Category 3 – high impact. These applications would be subjected to full PAC approval
mechanisms. Examples include applications that fail to satisfy any one of the criteria for
assessment at stage one (e.g. questions over the public interest in the research, safe data,
safe people or safe environments, or wider risks such as reputation of the data controller);
raise concerns arising from the privacy impact assessment at stage two (e.g. very sensi-
tive data; serious risks of disclosiveness) and/or are multiple sector or international lin-
kages being requested for the first time.
In all cases, appropriate terms and conditions for sharing and linkage reflect the nature
of the governance pathway followed by any given application and can be associated with
different categories of applications. For example, category 3 might attract additional
conditions about security or guarantees of no further linkages. Category 1 should be
treated as standard linkages subject to everyday duties of confidentiality and institutional
standards.
The categorisation approach is designed not only to offer a more proportionate
approach to risk allocation but to harmonise and speed-up the review process, render-
ing the applications and approvals process more efficient for researchers and data cus-
todians alike.159 It is sufficiently generic to be of interest and value across a range of
data linkage scenarios, both within the health sector and beyond, and also inside and
outside Scotland. The remaining two elements of the SHIP model are an online training
and accreditation module and guidance on roles and responsibilities of data controllers.
Thus, in sum, Figure 2 summarises the approach that was employed in developing the
PPGM.
Limitations and challenges for the model
As with all models, the SHIP approach has its limitations. It is important to note two
points here. First, SHIP does not attempt to address the prevailing culture of caution
by providing more certainty, at least in the first instance. If anything, it embraces the
reality that delicate and, at times, difficult judgement calls about data linkage must be
159. For a more detailed account of the categorisation approach see G. Laurie and N. Sethi,
‘Towards Good Governance’, p. 35.
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made. It might not, therefore, reassure some actors who seek more immediate clarity and
security. We suggest, however, that such a search for security is illusory. What is needed,
in particular, is a shift from defensive consent–reliant attitudes towards more confident
data sharing and access, adopting a range of alternative mechanisms such as authorisa-
tion. It is hoped that the key elements of our approach, especially the training programme
and the guiding principles, can serve to reassure researchers and data custodians when
navigating the governance landscape.
Second, in order to operate effectively and timeously, there is a need for adequate
resource and training for decision-makers themselves, including data controllers. It will
only be through uptake and use of the system that streamlining benefits will be realised.
In particular, the role of the Research Coordinator is crucial. This will often require addi-
tional resource, or redeployment, within organisations. If this resource is not put in place,
delays will occur and time frames will not be respected. The aspiration of proportionality
can only partly be delivered through iterative design. Its execution also requires commit-
ted personnel.
Conclusion
The SHIP principled proportionate governance model has identified and seeks to address
the pressing needs of research uses of health data, for which the current regulatory frame-
work is both untenable and undesirable. The model challenges the traditional obstacles
within the landscape, encouraging a shift away from the culture of caution and a willing-
ness to take advantage of the flexibilities within the current landscape. It offers a data
linkage regime that reflects iterative, intelligent design, taking into account both research
and public expectations. Key elements of the model include (1) guiding principles and
best practice, (2) safe, effective and proportionate governance, (3) an articulation of the
roles and responsibilities of data controllers and data processors and (4) the development
of a researcher training programme, including appropriate vetting procedures prior to
sharing valuable data.
The research and collaborations under the SHIP project serve as a case in point that
a flexible, accessible solution can be developed and adopted, not only in the health
research setting but across sectors and across jurisdictions. The model builds upon
existing approaches to information governance and goes far beyond them, whilst
retaining due regard for the ethical and legal norms at stake. It offers a practical solu-
tion to moving forward in realising the potential benefits of data uses for health
research and which can be implemented currently, rather than awaiting (yet further)
legislative reforms. It recognises the important place of consent by making it a rebut-
table presumption of research governance, whilst offering a clearer role for comple-
mentary governance mechanism, such as authorisation. These promote risk-based
approaches and principle-based reflection, judgement and communication of
decision-making. It is a model that is anticipatory in design, adaptable to future (immi-
nent) developments in data linkage, most notably for cross-sectoral and international
settings. Proportionality plays a central role in enabling decision-makers to undertake
appropriate evaluation of risks and benefits. It helps to ensure that researchers and data
custodians are not practising conservative data sharing out of fear of sanctions. At the
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same time, it acknowledges that sanctions that are imposed should be relative to the
risks involved. The model determinedly complements any existing or future legal
framework by seeking to fill the spaces within it. Principles and instances of best prac-
tice offer a means of universalisable deployment of relevant norms and values, promot-
ing high standards of research across the data sharing life cycle, across diverse settings,
with concrete examples of how these principles can be implemented. Most notably, this
principled proportionate approach offers a concrete means of balancing both the public
interests in health research and protection of patient privacy.
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